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In  this  paper  a  tractable  methodology  is  presented  to  improve  environmental 
sustainability by incorporating stakeholders’ intensities of preferences into the decision 
making process. The environmental decision making will be controversial when there is a 
complex issue at hand. The difficulty comes up as stakeholders cannot see how their 
preferences  are  taken  into  account  in  the  policy  making  process.  To  reduce  this 
controversy,  we  propose  a  qualitative  method  to  elicit  stakeholders’  intensities  of 
preferences towards a set of environmental services. Subsequently, the elicited intensities 
of  preferences  are  aggregated  by  a  mathematical  approach  on  each  single  criterion. 
Finally, a multi-criteria approach is applied to use the aggregated values across all criteria 
to provide the analyst with a rank order of existing alternative plans. In this way, the 
stakeholders  are  able  to  verify  that  their  opinion  is  taken  into  account,  even  if  it  is 
contrary  to  the  majority  voice.  The  natural  resources  manager  will  benefit  from  an 
increased insight into the prevalent opinion on each of the criteria through the supplied 
social intensities of preferences, enabling a more easily communicated justification of the 
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1. Introduction 
 
The  aim  of  this  paper  is  to  introduce  a  methodology  to  incorporate  stakeholders’ 
intensities of preferences into the environmental decision making to enable the natural 
resources manger to formulate an acceptable decision. Any complex environment with a 
diversity of economic, ecological and social services will be a centre of attraction for 
different social groups. To allow ecological economists to develop value indicators for 
decision making, they need to identify the services provided by the ecosystem and to 
determine the value that each of these services provide to the interested social groups. 
But in order to do so, they must understand and acknowledge the inherent complexities of 
economic, ecological and social systems. Because of these complexities, environmental 
valuation  practitioners  have  introduced  different  valuation  methodologies  to  elicit 
people’s preferences. Environmental valuation approaches such as Contingent Valuation 
Method (CVM) or Deliberative Monetary Valuation (DMV) (Spash, 2007), simply use a 
common scale (e.g. monetary) to make direct trade-offs between environmental criteria 
and  market  products  to  estimate  individual  or  social  Willingness  to  Pay  (WTP) 
respectively. However, economic efficiency is only one of a diversity of the indicators 
that  can  guide  decision  making.  These  methods  have  therefore  received  considerable 
criticisms  coming  from  economic  (Hausman,  1993;  Diamond  and  Hausman,  1994; 
Knetsch, 1994; Vatn, 2004), political (Cookson, 2000; Smith, 2003; Tompkins, 2003) 
and psychological fields (Kahneman et al., 1999; Vatn, 2004).  
Valuation methodologies mostly provide inputs for decision making approaches such as 
Cost-Benefit Analysis (CBA), Group Decision Support System (GDSS) or Multi-Criteria 
Decision Aid (MCDA) to establish a social decision among different courses of action 
(Stirling, 1997; Varma et al., 2000; Stagl, 2003; Munda, 2004; Springael and De Keyser, 
2004; Stagl, 2005; Howarth and Wilson, 2006; Spash, 2007). In presence of multiple 
Decision Makers (DMs), natural resources managers always have difficulties to convince 
people  how  their  preferences  have  been  taken  into  account  in  the  decision  making 
process (Matsatsinis et al., 2005). In the recent years, some new methodologies such as 
Multi-Criteria Mapping (MCM) (Stirling, 1997), Deliberative Multi-Criteria Evaluation 
(DMCE) (Proctor and Drechsler, 2003) and other combined valuation methods have been 
introduced to improve the preference elicitation steps as well as the tractability of the   3 
decision making process (Stirling, 1997; Stagl, 2003; Stirling and Mayer, 2004; Munda, 
2006).  Although  these  new  methods  have  enabled  the  manger  to  consider  multiple 
dimensions  of  a  problem,  they  introduce  some  new  difficulties  to  stakeholders.  For 
example, in DMCE, DMs need to reach a consensus on the problem at hand. However, 
when the issue is very controversial and a diversity of social groups is involved, neither a 
consensus is an easy target to achieve nor it is representative of the groups’ opinions. 
Furthermore, most of these methods need to convert stakeholders’ ordinal preferences to 
cardinal values to be able to proceed with the aggregation step, which is mostly confusing 
and problematic for stakeholders (Godo and Torra, 2000; Vatn, 2004; Zendehdel et al., in 
press).  
To eliminate the criticisms, we propose a methodology that firmly roots in respect for the 
three  central  properties  of  environmental  decision  making:  environmental  and  social 
complexity,  incommensurability  between  environmental  criteria  (no trade-off  between 
different criteria) and plurality of environmental values. The methodology partly consists 
of  an  exploratory  discussion  among  different  groups  of  stakeholders,  who  will  be 
identified based on a stakeholder analysis, to broaden their view on the problem at hand. 
This can be achieved by allowing each stakeholder group to formulate their interests in 
the area, which will lead to the identification of the multitude of environmental criteria 
under  discussion  and  environmental  plan(s).  The  second  step  in  the  methodology  is 
individualistic. In this step, stakeholders first attach a qualitative indicator from a list of 
indicators  as  a  weight  to  each  criterion.  Then,  impacts  of  plans  on  each  criterion, 
Alternative Impacts (AIs), will be used to elicit stakeholders’ preferences on each single 
criterion by asking them to rank the AIs on each selected criterion. In the next step, 
pairwise comparisons of the AIs on the constructed rank order allow the stakeholders to 
express their intensity of preference for each pair of AIs.  
By  having  stakeholders’  intensities  of  preferences  and  criteria  weights  (stakeholders’ 
inputs), one needs to apply a tractable process to establish a group decision that meets 
social support. Doing so, we propose to use a mathematical approach OSDL (Ordinal 
Stochastic Dominance Learner) (Lievens, and De Baets, in press; Lievens, et al. in press), 
to provide social intensities of preferences to be used as an input into an outranking 
method (ARGUS). ARGUS stands for Achieving Respect for Grades by Using ordinal   4 
Scales only, and it is capable to handle quantitative and qualitative information in the 
same way (De Keyser and Peeters, 1994). Therefore, the social intensities of preferences 
and social weights will simultaneously be processed by ARGUS to provide a rank order 
of the alternative plans (De Keyser and Peeters, 1994; Springael and De Keyser, 2004). 
Due to the use of the social intensities of preferences and social weights, the number of 
intensities and weights that need to simultaneously processed, is reduced. In this regard, 
the natural resources manager and DMs will then benefit from an increased tractability in 
the decision making process.  
 
2.  A  multi-criteria  deliberative  approach  to  elicit  stakeholders’  intensities  of 
preferences on multiple environmental criteria 
 
The methodology starts with Stakeholder Analysis (SA) to identify the different social 
groups  which  benefit  from  environmental  services  in  the  area.  Subsequently,  group 
discussions  will  be  conducted  among  representatives  of  the  social  groups  to  define 
environmental problems and to establish a list of environmental criteria and applicable 
alternative  plans  to  support  the  criteria.  Next,  the  lists  of  environmental  criteria  and 
alternative plans are given to a group of experts to construct an Impact Matrix (IM). 
Table  1  provides  us  with an  IM,  which  is  a  part  from  an  IM  related  to  a  rangeland 
decision making study (Lar rangeland) (Zendehdel et al., in press). In the IM one can find 
the criteria but the names of proposed plans are removed from the table, which its reason 
will be explained later in this section. 
Once this matrix is obtained and AIs are determined, the question is how stakeholders 
can  use  these  AIs  to  express  their  preferences  in  a  straightforward  manner.  As 
psychologists  have  indicated,  human  cognitive  capacity  is  quite  limited  and  people 
cannot take a large number of alternatives into account at the same time to come up with 
a right choice (Miller, 1955; De Keyser and Peeters, 1994; Cookson, 2000; Saaty and 
Ozdemir, 2003). To eliminate this problem, environmental criteria are considered once at 
a  time  and  the  stakeholders  are  asked  to  rank  and  then  make  parwise  comparisons 
between AIs on each single criterion. Therefore, stakeholders compare the usefulness of 
alternative plans on each single criterion by providing a rank order of the plans without 
the need to take other criteria into account. However, in presence of conflicts among   5 
social groups (which is mostly the case) one cannot use directly alternative plans to elicit 
stakeholders’ intensities of preferences (De Keyser and Peeters, 1994). In other words, 
using alternative plans to elicit stakeholders’ preferences where there are conflicts among 
the stakeholders, will influence their preferences and motivate them to act politically and 
express biased preferences. In this regard, the name of each plan is eliminated from the 
IM  and  AIs  are  used  to  elicit  stakeholders’  preferences  and  their  intensities.  The 
following section provides more information on the elicitation of stakeholders’ intensities 
of preferences.  
 
 
3. Elicitation of criteria weight and stakeholders’ intensities of preferences  
 
 3.1 Construction of an impact matrix 
 
Table 1 presents us with an IM. To simplify the impacts in the IM , we present the criteria 
with a to h respectively, and denote the specific AIs for each criterion with subscripts 1, 
2, … up to the number of distinct AIs proposed by the 4 hypothetical plans. We have 
Table 1. Impact matrix of different alternative plans on environmental criteria  
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* The scores range from 0 to 10, where a score of 10 corresponds to availability of the service up 
to the maximal theoretically realisable capacity and a score of 0 corresponds to unavailability of 
the service   6 
opted to use a natural ordering to assigns subscripts to AIs, i.e., the AI denoted with 
subscript 1 is the ecologically most desirable impact proposed. For example, all other 
things  remaining  equal,  taking  measures  to  promote  wildlife  diversity  is  ecologically 
more desirable than doing the opposite. Hence, the AI of strong support for the Wildlife 
Diversity  criterion  (d)  would  be  denoted  d1,  as  it  is  the  largest  increase  in  support 
proposed by one or more of the four plans, in this case by the first of the four plans. 
Obviously,  it is not  always  the  case  that  the  first  plan  proposed  the  environmentally 
optimal choice, as can be easily verified in Table 1. Consequently, for the criterion d the 
AIs d1, d2, d3 and d4 stand for strong increase, moderate increase, small increase and no 
increase in support respectively. For the Recreation criterion (h), the values of h1, h2, h3 
and h4 stand for score 8, 5, 4 to 3 respectively (denoting on a 0 to 10 scale to what extent 
the recreational facilities of Lar rangeland will be exploited).  
 
3.2 Weighting the environmental criteria 
 
Based  on  people’s  experience  to  use  qualitative  labels  to  attach  weights  to  different 
objectives (Cook and Seiford, 1984; Liljas and Lindgren, 2001; Vatn, 2004), qualitative 
indicators  are  used  to  order  environmental  criteria.  The  qualitative  labels  are: 
Unimportant  (Uim)  –  Little  important  (Lim)  –  Moderately  important  (Mim)  –  Very 
important (Vim) – Extremely important (Eim). The stakeholders should use these labels to 
express how important each of the criteria is, according to their own view. The weights 
should be attached prior to the elicitation of the intensities of preferences.  
To elicit stakeholders’ intensities of preferences, two steps are needed: the stakeholders 
indicate their preferences by making a rank order of AIs, after which they express the 
intensities of their preferences by using a qualitative scale. 
 
3.3 Elicitation of stakeholders’ preferences 
 
An individual’s preferences can be represented by an ordinal utility function (ordinal rank 
order)  without  necessitating  the  existence  of  a  common  scale  and  making  trade-offs 
between environmental criteria (Cook and Kress, 1985; Liljas and Lindgren, 2001; Cook, 
2006).  Each stakeholder  can  rank  the  AIs  for  each  criterion  in  a different  way,  they 
neither need to agree with each other nor with the environmentally optimal ordering. To   7 
come up with an ordinal utility function, respondents are individually will be asked to 
provide a rank order of AIs on each single criterion. In the Choice Experiment (CE), 
researchers use alternative plans and their attributes to elicit respondents’ preferences 
(Garrod and Kenneth, 1999), but in our methodology the AIs (and not the alternative 
plans)  are  used  to  establish  the  stakeholders’  ordinal  utility  function.  In  this  regard, 
respondents  should  first rank these  AIs  for each criterion  according to  their  personal 
preference, without the possibility of easily doing so on the basis of political motivations. 
Tables 2 and 3 show rank orders of AIs for the Wildlife Diversity and the Recreation 
criteria, as well as the frequency of each rank order for 31 stakeholders related to the Lar 
rangeland study (Zendehdel et al., in press). As can be seen in Table 2, it is possible to 
have a majority view among the rank orders or the rank orders do not show any majority. 
For  example,  a  50%  majority  exists  among  the  rank  orders  of  AIs  for  the  Wildlife 
Diversity criterion (18 stakeholders out of the 31 chose d1>d2>d3>d4 as their rank order), 
while there is no such majority among the rank orders for the Recreation criterion. 
 
3.4 Elicitation of stakeholders’ intensities of preferences 
 
The  main  difficulty  faced  by  researchers  in  environmental  valuation  is  eliciting 
respondents’  intensities  of  preferences  in  a  way  that  respects  the  three  properties  of 
incommensurability, complexity of environmental criteria and plurality of environmental 
values. As explained previously, the stakeholders provided us with a rank order (ordinal 
utility  function)  of  AIs  on  each  single  criterion  in  the  last  step  of  the  methodology. 
However, an ordinal utility function is weak as it does not give any information about 
stakeholders’  intensities  of  preferences  (Spash,  2007).  This  weakness  can  be 
circumvented by asking respondents to express their intensities among each pair of AIs 
(Springael and De Keyser, 2004). The scale of these intensities can be quantitative as 
well as qualitative. But as people use a qualitative format to express their intensities of 

















To prevent using quantitative valuations, we propose a purely qualitative approach. To do 
this, stakeholders are asked to make pairwise comparisons between AIs and express their 
intensity of preference on a 5 point qualitative scale: very small preference (vsm) - small 
preference  (sm)  -  moderate  preference  (mo)  -  strong  preference  (st)  -  very  strong 
preference  (vst).  To  facilitate  a  respondent  to  be  consistent  on  their  intensities  of 
preferences during the pairwise comparisons, a preference matrix is constructed based on 
each stakeholder’s rank order of AIs (De Keyser, and Peetres 2004). Table 4 shows such 








The table shows h2>h3>h4>h1 (abbreviated as h2h3h4h1) as an example of a rank order in 
which AIs for the Recreation criterion (h) have been established from worst to best (left 
to right and top to bottom). Each cell in the lower left triangle should be filled in by one 
of the values from the qualitative indicators. The stakeholders should follow a simple 
consistency rule to express their intensities of preferences: the intensity of preference 
Table 2- Rank orders of AIs  
 for the Wildlife diversity criterion (d) 
  Number of 
respondents  Rank order 
18  d1>d2>d3>d4 
  3  d3>d4>d2>d1 
3  d4>d3>d2>d1 
2  d2>d1>d3>d4 
1  d2>d3>d1>d4 
1  d2>d4>d3>d1 
1  d3>d2>d4>d1 
1  d4>d2>d3>d1 
1  d2>d3>d4>d1 
d1: Strong increase  
d2: Moderate 
increase 
     d3: Small increase 
     d4: No increase       
Table 3- Rank orders of AIs   
for the Recreation criterion (h) 
Number of  
respondents  Rank order 
                 11  h2> > > >h3> > > >h4> > > >h1 
9  h1> > > >h2> > > >h3> > > >h4 
8  h2> > > >h4> > > >h3> > > >h1 
2  h2> > > >h1> > > >h3> > > >h4 
1  h3> > > >h4> > > >h2> > > >h1 
h1: Score 8           
h2: Score 5           
    h3: Score 4 
    h4: Score 3 
Table 4- General structure of a preference matrix 
for the Recreation criterion (h)  
Criterion h  h1  h4  h3  h2 





Indifferent   
 
 
  h3 
 
    Indifferent   






Indifferent   9 
should neither decrease from top to bottom nor from right to left in the preference matrix 
(Table 4). This means that if a respondent expressed a strong intensity of preference for 
one of the top left cells, such as the preference of h4 over h1, (h4h1) then he  cannot 
indicate a weaker intensity of preference in one of the cells that lie immediately below, 
such as for the preference of h3 over h1 (h3h1) or for that of h2 over h1 (h2h1) as the rank 
order is h2h3h4h1 (Table 4). The pairwise comparisons should be done for each single 
criterion and the respondents do not need to make trade-offs between different criteria. 
This helps stakeholders  to focus on just one criterion and express their intensities of 
preferences based on that specific criterion without having to take into account other 
criteria (Springael and De Keyser, 2004). 
An example of a completed preference matrix is provided in Table 5 for the Recreation 
criterion (h). It shows the intensities of preferences of a respondent whose rank order is 
h2h3h4h1.  The  respondent  filled  in  the  lower  triangle  with  the  qualitative  intensities 
(shown in bold). As one can see the expressed intensities have a consistent structure 
(monotonicity) and follow the mentioned rule. The significance of the upper part of the 
triangle (containing negative values) will be explained in Section 5. Based on the elicited 
intensities of preferences for each criterion for all respondents, we want to calculate the 










4. Construction of social intensities of preferences and social weight on each single 
criterion 
 
4.1 Establishing a social rank order among individual rank orders 
 
To determine social intensities of preferences, first a social rank order is needed among 
the stakeholders’ rank orders of AIs on each single criterion. A social rank order can be 
Table 5- Completed preference matrix 
 for the Recreation criterion (h)  
  Criterion  h  h1  h4  h3  h2 
h1  Indifferent  −mo  −st  −vst 
h4  +mo  Indifferent  −st  −st 
h3  +st  +st  Indifferent  −vst 
h2  +vst  +vst  +vst  Indifferent   10 
reached according to different ranking rules. In absence of strategic considerations, one 
can identify the most preferred alternative among different pairwise comparisons based 
on the Condorcet criterion. The preferred alternative among a set of alternatives is the 
one  that  receives  a  majority  of  votes  over  the  other  alternatives  (Condorcet  winner) 
(Craven, 1992; Nurmi, 1999). For the Wildlife Diversity criterion (d), a majority rank 
order (d1d2d3d4) is shown to exist among the rank orders. However, we have no such 
majority for the Recreation criterion (h). In this case we determine the Condorcet winner 
as the social rank order h2h3h4h1. In case of a Condorcet cycle, we propose to resolve the 
paradox in a way that results in a minimal number of protest voices among stakeholders. 
Therefore, we recommend to use Condorcet’s maximal agreement method, also known as 
Kemeny’s approach (Mas-Colell et al., 1995; Nurmi, 1999).  
 
4.2 Establishing social intensities of preferences based on the social rank order 
 
After establishing a social rank order of AIs on each single criterion, the second step is to 
construct the social intensities of preferences based on the social rank order. This can be 
done based on the median value among the intensities of preferences while taking the 
social rank order and stochastic monotonicity into account. In the case of respondents 
indicating different preferences, not everyone will fully agree with the social rank order. 
As one can see in Tables 3 and 4, the rank orders can differ from one individual to the 
next. For those whose rank order is different from the social rank order, we are unable to 
directly use the intensities of preferences to obtain a social value based on each pair of 
the social rank order. To be able to use every respondent’s intensities of preferences, we 
opted to mirror the intensities of preferences for all individuals (Table 5, upper triangle). 
This step enables us to have all possible pairwise comparisons (12 pairs based on 4 AIs). 
For such a multitude of opinions and a single social rank order, the problem is thus to 
compute a monotone structure on the basis of a collection of such partially non-monotone 
structures of AIs. Instead of the regular monotonicity constraint, which is simply not 
applicable to distributions, the distributions of intensities for the preferences in the social 
rank order are bound by the stochastic monotonicity constraint. The concept of stochastic 
monotonicity is of great importance, as it is a required property if one aims to regard the 
social rank order as one that accurately reflects the group consensus (Cao-Van and De   11 
Baets,  2004;  Lievens  and  De  Baets,  in  press;  Lievens  et  al.,  in  press).  Stochastic 
monotonicity is defined on cumulative distributions. One distribution is said to dominate 
another one, if, seen as functions, it lies below this second one. Two distributions are 
stochastically monotone w.r.t. each other if the one that should contain the higher values, 
dominates  the  one  that  should  contain  the  lower  values.  If  this  is  not  the  case,  the 
distributions are not stochastically monotone w.r.t. each other. In this way, stochastically 
non-monotone distributions on the intensities of preference do not only signify that the 
group is not in consensus on the rank order of the AIs, but can even lead to inconsistent 
social intensities of preference. Presence of stochastic monotonicity between distributions 
of AIs can be guaranteed by applying OSDL.  
The Ordinal Stochastic Dominance Learner (OSDL) framework (Lievens et al., in press) 
consists of a main theorem that helps building monotone distribution-based classifiers. 
One of these classifiers is OSDL, which is only one of several variants of an algorithm to 
solve the supervised ranking problem. As we are dealing with distributions of intensities 
for each pairwise comparison of AIs, the explicit distribution-based approach makes this 
framework  very  well  suited  to  our  particular  problem.  We  give  here  only  a  limited 
introduction  to  the  framework,  more  information  can  be  found  in  (Lievens  et  al.,  in 
press). The input to the algorithm will be the (possibly stochastically non-monotone) set 
of distributions, and the output will be a stochastically monotone set of distributions. We 
propose to regard these monotone distributions as a necessary reflection of the group 
consensus on the relative order of the preferences (i.e. which preference is implied by the 
other one) or the social rank order.  
 
4.3 Providing social weights of criteria 
 
As the stakeholders used linguistic labels to attach weights to the criteria, one can choose 
the median among the attached weights as a social weight for that criterion. It is also 
possible to take the median from those whose rank order is identical to the Social Rank 
Order of Alternative Impact (SROAI) on the given criterion. It might be reasonable to 
take into account only the weight of those stakeholders agreeing with the social rank 
order, as taking into account the weight of those stakeholders that do not agree with the 
social rank order, could result in protests: a decision they did not support, could receive a   12 
greater weight because of their input. On the other hand, it is very well possible that only 
few stakeholders or none of the stakeholders chose the SROAI, in which case the median 
of those agreeing with the rank order can hardly be considered to be representative for the 
entire group of stakeholders. For this reason we recommend using the first approach to 
establish social weight.  
 
5.  Using  ARGUS  to  determine  the  group  decision  based  on  social  intensities  of 
preferences and weights of criteria 
 
After  providing  social  intensities  of  preferences  and  weights  of  criteria,  one  should 
choose a compatible MCDA with respect to the structure of data to be used to establish a 
group decision. Among different MCDA the outranking methods have some advantages 
to others (Kangas et al., 2001; Proctor and Drechsler, 2003; Cook, 2006; Munda, 2006). 
Outranking  methods  are  able  to  deal  with  uncertain,  qualitative  and  quantitative 
preferences of DMs (Proctor and Drechsler, 2003; Springael and De Keyser, 2004). We 
opt to use ARGUS in our methodology, as it is an outranking method that can handle 
qualitative  and  quantitative  preferences  without  requiring  the  decision  criteria  to  be 
commensurable (De  Keyser and Peeters, 1994; Springael and De  Keyser, 2004). The 
method uses concordance and discordance indices to determine a credibility matrix to 
establish  a  pre-order  relation  of  alternatives.  As  ARGUS  processes  criteria  without 
supposing  commensurability,  it  does  not  necessarily  output  a  rank  order,  i.e.,  some 
alternatives may become indifferent, while others remain incomparable (De Keyser and 
Peeters, 1994). A stakeholder needs only to enter, for each criterion, his/her weight and 
intensities  of  preferences.  In  our  method,  we  will  let  ARGUS  determine  the  group 
decision by entering the social weights and social intensities of preferences.  
ARGUS combines intensities of preferences with weight of the corresponding criterion to 
provide  an  indicator  with  a  specific  rank  number  and  a  positive  or  negative  sign 
depending on the direction of preference (De Keyser and Peeters, 1994; Springael and De 
Keyser, 2004). The indicators constitute a totally ordered set, and indicators with lower 
rank numbers are the result of stronger intensities of preferences and/or higher weight 
than those with higher rank numbers. Each combination of intensities of preferences and 
weight corresponds to a specific indicator, though multiple combinations can yield the   13 
same one. Based on these negative and positive symbols for all criteria, one can establish 




Environmental sustainability requires sustainable decision making, which in turn requires 
the incorporation of the stakeholders’ preferences into the decision making process. This 
process increases the acceptability of the final decision (Pearce, 1993; Pykäläinen et al., 
1999; Proctor and Drechsler, 2003). Decision aiding methodologies need to be judged 
w.r.t. their consistency and transparency, key factors in meeting social support towards 
the group decision. In this regard, it is reasonable to pay special care to correctly process 
stakeholders’  intensities  of  preferences,  as  they  are  related  to  the  strength  of  their 
conviction to support or oppose a plan. In our methodology, stakeholders’ intensities will 
be maintained in every step of the decision making process, so as to determine the group 
decision in a consistent way. 
Because even the best understood methodology will no longer be tractable if the number 
of inputs is too large, we opt to input social intensities of preferences and social weights 
into  ARGUS,  rather  than  each  individual  stakeholder’s  intensities  of  preferences  and 
weights of criteria. Even though the calculation of the social intensities of preferences 
amounts  to  an  increase  in  complexity  of  the  application  of  the  MCDA,  we  feel  the 
methodology as a whole becomes more understandable and tractable as a result. The 
provision of social intensities of preferences and social weights helps both stakeholders 
and natural resources mangers to see the diversity of opinions, as well as the overall 
social choice for each single criterion. Moreover, it is clear that the methodology does not 
take  into  account  solely  the  majority’s  view,  as  more  contested  criteria  will  by 
construction receive lower social intensities of preferences through the use of OSDL. We 
focus on the intensities of preferences as the reasons why one plan will meet with less 
opposition and more support than another one. This is in contrast with GDSS approaches 
which mostly focus too much on the stakeholders’ preferences and not enough on the 
corresponding  intensities  (Matsatsinis  et  al.,  2005).  Stakeholders  will  understand  that 
decreased intensities of preference will lead to lower rank numbers in ARGUS, causing 
the corresponding criteria to play a smaller role in the determination of the final decision.   14 
Minority groups will consequently be able to see and understand how their voices were 
taken into account in the social rank orders when performing the conflict resolution. All 
stakeholders  will  therefore  more  readily  accept  the  group  decision,  which  in  turn 
improves the environmental sustainability. This is due in part to the fact that we opt to 
resolve conflicting preferences and corresponding intensities as soon as possible, rather 
than waiting until the very end, by resolving conflicting rank orders of alternatives. The 
SROAIs will also prove invaluable if ARGUS should output not a total rank order, but 
rather  indicate  some  incomparability  among  plans.  On  the  basis  of  the  SROAIs  and 
associated  intensities,  a  natural  resources  manager  can  more  easily  understand  how 
exactly  the  incomparability  arises.  More  importantly,  through  the  SROAIs,  social 
intensities and social weights, the natural resources manger can determine the expected 
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